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Marine Corps Command and Control Doctrine-Where  
Is It? Coming to a Base Near You

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Thesis: The United States Marine Corps Doctrine Division can only approach Fleet Marine Force (FMF) expectations for timely and accurate doctrine with increased organizational support, budget, staffing, and decentralization of draft responsibilities. This paper recommends the adoption of a Combat Development Process.

USMC; Command and Control; C2; C3; C4I;  
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**MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT?  
COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU**

Submitted to  
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8 April 1993

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**MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT?  
COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU**

**OUTLINE**

Thesis: Doctrine Division can only approach Fleet Marine Force (FMF) expectations for timely and accurate doctrine with increased organizational support, budget, staffing, and decentralization of draft responsibilities.

- I. THE "WINDS OF CHANGE"
  - A. National Military Strategy Upheaval
  - B. Technology's Impact
  - C. Reactions to Strategic Flux
- II. MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND'S IDENTITY CRISIS
  - A. Concepts Based Requirement System Version 3.0
  - B. Combat Development Process Saga
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**MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT?  
COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU**

Fifty-five years ago the development of amphibious doctrine and its subsequent validation in World War II ensured our independence as a separate service. From 1933 to 1934, Marine Corps schools were devoted to solving this doctrinal identity crisis.(8:80) Maintaining a robust and unique doctrine today is no less vital to the Marine Corps' survival as it was then. Many say we are in the midst of a doctrinal crisis again. However, our inability to produce, maintain, and update doctrine **quickly** characterizes the current dilemma. Presently, much of Marine Corps doctrine is intuitive and experiential, not codified in formally published documents. Our doctrine and its production apparatus appear to have atrophied over the last fifteen years. Publications remain in the production pipeline from several months to several years. On the surface, it would appear that those in charge of doctrine just are not doing their jobs. However, there are many more complex issues involved.

Several months ago we were tasked with finding Command and Control doctrine. FMFM 3, the command and control capstone document, answers this request. However, FMFM 3's

evolution indicates continued serious problems with producing quality doctrine in a timely fashion. Further, research exposes a gross ignorance in the Fleet Marine Force of the complexities involved in producing doctrine, exacerbating perceptions that doctrine production is stagnant. Simply stated, Doctrine Division can only approach FMF expectations for timely and accurate doctrine with increased organizational support, budget, staffing, and decentralization of draft responsibilities.

Many factors contribute to this state of affairs. These factors can be divided into those within the Marine Corps' control and those outside our control. Factors beyond our control are current changes in the focus of the national military strategy and the continuing impact of new technology on the battlefield. Those within our control are the turmoil and confusion within Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) resulting from numerous reorganizations, the most recent in preparation for transition to the Combat Development Process (CDP). This reorganization has left an ambiguous chain of command which still lacks the philosophical foundation, the CDP, to ensure unity of effort. Negative factors within Doctrine Division are an unrealistic table of organization, inadequate budget, draft responsibilities which exceed personnel capabilities, and lack of an effective prioritization system.

Development of FMFM 3 illustrates all of these problems. We feel current system weaknesses should disappear with final transition to the CDP. However, it may be six months to a year before the transition is complete and operations are running smoothly. Yet, improvements can be made now to organizational support and Doctrine Division draft responsibilities. We recommend the following:

- Establishing an interim manually coordinated prioritization system across divisions;
- Improving communication and coordination across divisions;
- Speeding up transition to the Combat Development Process;
- Decentralizing authorship responsibilities; and
- Maximizing adoption of other service doctrine.

Suggestions such as closing Marine Corps Schools for a year so staff and students can write doctrine as done in 1933 would only address the symptom, not the illness. Our recommendations provide a long term cure ready for the challenges of the future.

#### **THE "WINDS OF CHANGE"**

##### **National Military Strategy Upheaval**

Currently evolving doctrine is being buffeted by the "winds of change" as the United States reevaluates its national military strategy. Roles and missions are being reviewed. "Jointness" is rapidly becoming the rule rather

than the exception. The services are more and more likely to be assigned non-traditional roles like the humanitarian operation in Somalia. Thus, the Marine Corps' niche in "the big picture" is changing just as the picture's landscape is changing.

### **Technology's Impact**

Further complicating the production of doctrine is the rapid evolution of technology as we integrate new systems on the battlefield. Advances in communications, guided munitions, and navigation systems have sped up the pace of battle. The speed and plethora of information have inundated commanders and altered their approach to the battlefield, requiring innovative solutions to the information overload. Consequently, C4I2 systems and procedures are being developed to deal with the challenges of information collection and dissemination. However, military systems and planners have fallen outside the technological "OODA loop" and are scrambling to keep up with the pace of technological change.

So how do the evolving military strategy and technological explosion impact doctrine development in the Marine Corps? Simply, doctrine documents the tremendous amount of **rapid change** occurring. Recent conferences are exploring the emerging role of naval expeditionary forces where, "forward presence of U.S. forces will be useful in forestalling regional conflicts, in alleviating trouble

before it becomes a full-blown crisis." Further, the conferences have concluded, "naval expeditionary forces are well-suited to this emerging security environment." (5:53-55)

#### **Reactions to Strategic Flux**

Validating these themes is the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper "...From the Sea" which defines a new combined vision for the two services. Two points are of interest. First, command, control, and surveillance were listed as one of the four key operational capabilities required to successfully execute this **new direction** for the Navy and Marine Corps. Secondly, a Naval Doctrine Command was established emphasizing that, "Integration on the battlefield starts with integration of doctrine and training." (13:22) Further, it states that the new command will, "close the gap between the air-land battle and amphibious warfare...." (13:22) All of this has tremendous implications for the Marine Corps' current doctrine, doctrine in development, and new doctrine that will be required to assimilate all of this change.

As such, FMFM 3 is an excellent example of doctrine formed in strategic flux. In Chapter Four of the Coordinating Draft of FMFM 3, Marine Corps command and control methods are modeled after the Navy's Copernicus structure and emphasize interoperability between the Marine Corps and the Navy using principles in "...From the Sea."



However, during conferences reviewing FMFM 3, legitimate concerns were raised regarding the Marine Corps' history of sustained operations ashore. The concerns were significant because the Navy's command and control structure differs from the Army's, and sustained operations ashore require extensive interface between the Marine Corps and the Army. The need for dual compatibility was not addressed in the publication. The omission was highlighted again by the Doctrinal Review Board who ordered revision of the chapter.(14:1) Thus, a shift in strategic role emphasis overshadowed the need to account for historical operational precedents.

#### **MCCDC's IDENTITY CRISIS**

##### **Concepts Based Requirement System Version 3.0**

Having considered factors beyond the Marine Corps' control, let us consider factors we do control. Doctrine is not created in a vacuum. In the Marine Corps, doctrine is actually just one of many endproducts of what **was** the concepts based requirement system (CBRS). Once again, Marine Corps Combat Development Command has overhauled the CBRS. Now the CBRS is only the front end of the newly adopted Marine Corps Combat Development Process. Thus, a full understanding of the Marine Corps' current shortfalls in doctrine requires understanding MCCDC's struggle with developing an efficient system and organizational structure.

Appendix 1 illustrates the original CBRS depicted in the MAGTF Warfighting Center's Standing Operating Procedures of 1988. Obviously, this system was quite lengthy and unwieldy. Upon assuming duty as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Mundy appointed a Combat Development Planning Group to study the Marine Corps's system(s) for facilitating and integrating change in the Corps (procurement, training and education, doctrine, etc.). The CDP was the result of this study. This new process is the engine that will drive the integration of change into doctrine, training and education, organization, equipment, facilities, and support.(2:1) However, the CDP's lengthy development and adoption is one of many factors hindering efforts to correct doctrinal shortfalls.

#### **The Combat Development Process Saga**

Why is CDP development and adoption taking so long? Primarily, because the process which attempts to integrate planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and life cycle management into a single vehicle is extremely ambitious. The Marine Corps will field capabilities rather than independent pieces of equipment that previously lacked the doctrine, training, and organizational adjustments necessary to successfully field the equipment. A capability is a package consisting of **doctrine**, training and education, equipment, and organization. For example, the process will eliminate a situation where a machine gun requiring a two-man crew, new

ammunition, and increased range would hit the FMF without the new employment doctrine and tactics, the new table of organization, and any specialized equipment.(2:1) Obviously developing a capability is much more difficult than developing an individual piece of equipment or concept.

The comprehensiveness of the program has required the creation of new systems, new vocabulary, and most importantly, new ways of thinking. Now, every step of the process is being analyzed, reviewed, and reconfigured (inputs/outputs) as necessary. Information requirements, information flow, and elimination of redundancy are the focal points of the process. This analysis, review, and reorganization is extremely manpower and time intensive.

The process requires development of a new vocabulary and redefinition and clarification of the old Warfighting Center vocabulary. The Marine Corps wrangles with its own version of "political correctness" and consumes time debating semantics. However, MCCDC is in desperate need of a standard vocabulary when communicating across divisions, and therefore, must cope with this necessary evil.

Finally, resistance to change, whether vocabulary or methods, is endemic to the Marine Corps and its devotion to tradition. There are many who think the old way of doing things was just fine. Thus, the program must be taught, modified, and sold as it is developed. Changing old habits

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Corps' best minds could examine doctrinal quandaries forwarded by Doctrine Division. We do not recommend that

and philosophies can be the greatest challenge of all.

### **The Mythological Hydra**

Unfortunately, the key to making the process a success, a tracking system, is still under development. To better understand the importance of a tracking system, a general description of the process is helpful. Figure 1 outlines the process's basic architecture.(2:1)

## **COMBAT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**

*CMC PLANNING GUIDANCE *DEVELOP THE CONCEPT *ESTABLISH/ASSESS CAPABILITIES *DETERMINE THE REQUIREMENT	CONCEPT BASED REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM (CBRS)
*MEET THE REQUIREMENT -DOCTRINE            -EQUIPMENT -TRAINING           -EDUCATION -ORGANIZATION      -FAC/SUPPORT	SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (SDS)
*SUPPORT THE CAPABILITY -UPDATE            -REVIEW -MAINTAIN	CAPABILITY SUPPORT SYSTEM (CSS)

Figure 1

Three systems comprise the process: a concepts based requirement system (CBRS), a solution development system (SDS), and a capability support system (CSS).

The CBRS is responsible for taking the Commandant's Planning Guidance, developing the necessary concepts to support the guidance, establishing and assessing capabilities

to fulfill those concepts, and determining the deficiencies in those capabilities. These deficiencies are forwarded as requirements to the implementing divisions and commands responsible for doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, facilities, and support. These implementing divisions and commands produce the solution portion of the process. The solution then passes on to the capability support system once it is fulfilled where maintenance, review, and update occur as necessary.(2:1)

For example, a new capability for special operations is identified that requires a new piece of equipment. Deficiencies are noted in concepts, doctrine, training, and equipment. Each division receives a Requirement Needs Statement to fulfill its portion of that capability deficiency. This is where the tracking system is critical. Concepts may have a total of five requirements, doctrine three, training two, and requirements one. The tracking system allows prioritization of capability deficiencies and ensures the requirements needed to field that **capability** are prioritized accordingly **across** divisions. Thus, implementing divisions' products are Marine Corps' established priorities and not individual division priorities. Warfighting Development Integration Division is the likely candidate to oversee the tracking system.

Frustrating the establishment of an automated tracking system is absence of the necessary computer hardware and software. Additionally, the types and frequencies of reports, as well as those of the data transfer process, have yet to be determined. Also, the exact nature of data analysis and assessment that would be performed by Integration Division is still evolving.

Currently, even a manual tracking system does not exist. Divisions prioritize and track their own requirements with minimal coordination among divisions to ensure unity of effort. Each division is like a separate head on the body of MCCDC. Comprehensive SOP's and appropriate orders delineating division responsibilities and liaison to mitigate tracking deficiencies also do not exist. A Marine Corps order establishing and detailing the CDP is scheduled to appear this summer. Until an effective tracking system, coordinating methods, and written orders exist, MCCDC will continue to operate like the mythological Hydra it currently resembles.

#### **Ambiguous Command Relationships**

Aggravating tracking deficiencies are ambiguous command relationships. Clearly established lines of communication and coordination, i. e., command relationships, are integral to effective and timely mission accomplishment. However, MCCDC's structure has suffered constant flux since MCCDC's

inception in 1988. Each reorganization has attempted to rectify this debilitating characteristic. With each reorganization, valuable time, effort, manpower, and resources have been expended with no clear results. This is true of MCCDC's current structure which still misses the mark. Figure 2 on the following page outlines the current structure.

### MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATION




Figure 2

This structure's only benefit is providing divisions direct input into the Commanding General and making his influence more accessible. That is, if a division solicits input or responses from the Fleet, these requests receive more legitimacy and power by virtue of a lieutenant general's signature. Yet, for tracking, coordinating, and

accounting purposes, this structure violates the basic premises of a chain of command. Integration Division, which will ultimately orchestrate all of the divisions' efforts, is not in their direct chain of command. Having a lateral position in the chain of command reduces the Integration Division's ability to effectively coordinate priorities and resolve conflicts. Also, this horizontal chain of command creates no single point of contact for the other two commands at Quantico. If Integration Division is to oversee the resolution of Marine Corps capability deficiencies, it must occupy a senior level in the chain of command to be optimally effective.

The development of FMFM 3 is a clear example of not understanding the CDP architecture and the coordination vital to making the process a success. During January of 1992, Doctrine Division was directed to make the Command and Control capstone document its next priority. Capstone documents lay the philosophical foundation for a particular topic and provide a comprehensive synopsis of that doctrinal area. Subsequent documents under the capstone document provide additional detailed information concerning tactics and techniques in that functional area.

However, before developing a capstone document, Doctrine Division required a description of the Marine Corps' ideas about command and control. Concepts and Plans Division,



however, was not focusing on that type of concept at that time. In fact, Concepts and Plans Division was reevaluating its mission following the Warfighting Center's disbandment in August 1992.(7:1) Thus, Doctrine Division had to spend one month developing a concept on its own. Now, eight months later, Concepts and Plans Division has caught up to Doctrine Division and is providing them with a concept for a manual nearing publication. Obviously, valuable time was consumed and duplication of effort occurred. Currently, divisions act to minimize current weaknesses via ad hoc coordination and further refinement of internal procedures.

#### **A Concept Revolution**

An example of one division's efforts is the focus of concept development, the foundation of the CDP. Concept focus has greatly shifted in the last six months. Prior to the reorganization, Concepts and Plans Branch primarily developed narrow concepts such as non-combatant evacuation operations with specific conditions from which operational plans and orders could be developed. Broad concepts from which warfighting tenets (such as those contained in FMFM 1) and the supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures could be developed were handled by Doctrine Division as required. Concurrently, rapid changes in the global environment and technological applications created a "concept vacuum." Because the Marine Corps misdirected Concepts and Plans Division's concept focus, the system was inefficient at

best and slowed doctrine production. However, in the last six months a concept "revolution" has occurred within Concepts and Plans Division and its personnel have done the seemingly impossible: defined their role within the CBRS and shored up the conceptual framework upon which the Marine Corps is built.(7:1)

Figure 3 on the following page shows the result of their work and organizes a workable conceptual framework of the Marine Corps on which to base all peripheral operational concepts like command and control. It covers the spectrum of anticipated areas of operation: operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS), expeditionary operations, and sustained operations ashore (SOA). Beneath these warfighting and operational concepts fall the functional concepts, i. e., the tools with which our warfighting and operational concepts are built. Unfortunately, this codified conceptual framework has only existed for a short time, and therefore, has had minimal impact on the implementing divisions as exemplified by the debate concerning sustained operations ashore in Chapter Four of FMFM 3.




Figure 3

## DOCTRINE DIVISION DIFFICULTIES

### Dependency

Obviously, the content and timeliness of concept development impact Doctrine Division's ability to produce doctrine in a **timely** and **efficient** fashion. Doctrine Division is dependent upon the CBRS working. Doctrine is driven by mission need statements (MNS) forwarded from Requirements Division. Requirements Division develops MNS's from Marine Corps Lessons Learned (MCCLS), fleet operational needs statements (FONS), mission area analyses, CINC's list of priorities, and the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP). MNS's requiring development of a new publication or revision of an old one generally take eighteen months to accomplish.

Currently, no published timeline outlining document development exists.

### Creating a Publication

MNS's are directed to the appropriate section within Doctrine Division. The doctrine development process appears to have eleven basic steps as illustrated by Figure 4.

EVENT	BRANCH HEAD	SECTION HEAD	ACTION OFFICER	EDITOR	REMARKS
1. ASSIGNMENT	A	X			
2. POA&M	A	A	X	C	PURPOSE/SCOPE MILESTONES
3. GEN. OUTLINE	A*	A	X	C/R	
4. RESEARCH		C	X		AD HOC/CIV CONTRACTOR
5. DETAILED OUTLINE	A*	A	X	C/R	STAFFED BY MSG
6. COORD. DRAFT			X	C/R	
7. REVIEW	X*	X	X	C*	DRB/STAFFING
8. REWRITING			X	C/R*	
9. EDITING	A	A	X	X	
10. APPROVAL	X	X	X	X	SIGNED BY CG, MCCDC OR CMC
11. PRINTING/DISTRIB.			C	X	

X=ACTION    R=REVIEW    A=APPROVAL    C=COORDINATION    \*=AS NECESSARY

Figure 4

First, the MNS is studied to determine whether correction or revision to an existing publication will suffice. If not, the Division calls for a new publication to be drafted and an action officer is assigned. In step two, the action officer drafts a plan of action and milestones. This document includes preliminary information on purpose and scope and projections for TAD budgeting, conference scheduling, and editor/illustrator coordination. Normally, an editor is assigned here to assist the action officer.

Steps three, four, and five include drafting a general outline, conducting research, and preparing a detailed outline after the plan of action and milestones have been approved. Research is continuous in the publication development and refinement process. The action officer may make use of a team or external agency like the Amphibious Warfare School to assist in the research effort. Staffing the detailed outline ensures that all interested parties find the proposed doctrinal solution appropriate in scope, approach, and organization. Staffing gives the FMF and other interested parties an opportunity to recommend additional topics for inclusion, a differing approach, or a change in direction or emphasis for the manual. Staffing may take anywhere from six to twelve months. Providing doctrinal input is not always a Fleet priority. This attitude results in delays and an extended staffing timeframe.

Steps six, seven, eight, and nine cover coordinating drafts, review, rewriting, and editing. The coordinating draft is the preliminary document for a new publication and is distributed to many FMF organizations and Landing Force Training Commands. The coordinating draft is also reviewed by the Commandant's Doctrinal Review Board (DRB). Results from the board form the basis for revisions before the draft is republished as a draft FMFM or OH. As developmental products, FMFM's and OH's are precursors to approved Service doctrinal publications and require a final validation by the FMF. Editing occurs throughout the entire process. The

action officer submits the draft for several informal editorial rewrites throughout the process incorporating recommendations concerning readability, format, and structure.

The final two steps involve approval, printing, and distribution. The CG, MCCDC, forwards doctrinal publications for the Assistant Commandant's and Commandant's approval. Upon approval, the publication is returned to the Publications Section for printing and distribution with HQMC.(9:4.21)

#### **People, Money, Computers**

Creating a publication is obviously an involved and laborious process. Compounding development difficulties are unrealistic staffing, insufficient budget, and software and hardware incompatibilities. Each doctrinal section generally has one action officer excluding occasional reservist augmentation. Thus, one officer may be responsible for producing as many as ten to fifteen publications, as well as reviewing all documents within that doctrinal area. Doctrine Division is responsible for 389 Marine Corps, Joint, and Allied publications. Currently, 89 of the 276 Marine Corps publications are in various stages of draft or revision. Additionally, Doctrine Division personnel are also responsible for a myriad of other tasks such as preparing the MCBUL 5600 series, the Publications Master Plan, and publication distribution lists.(9:4.25) Twenty-seven officers, two enlisted, and fourteen civilians, equaling 83%

of the division's authorized personnel, are currently tackling these challenges.(14:1)

Doctrine Division also suffers from an inadequate budget. Only 2.6% of MCCDC's budget is allocated for those divisions that formerly comprised the Warfighting Center. Doctrine Division receives 38% of that amount.(14:1) The paucity of funds prevents Doctrine Division from using external research agencies which would greatly save on production time. The use of contractors on more tactical and technical manuals has proven to cut production time as much as one year, though at a cost. For example, the command and control study cost \$100,000.(14:1) Often, the savings in time is deemed not worth the savings in money.

Finally, the editorial process suffers from computer hardware and software incompatibilities.(14:1) The word processor programs used by the Marine Corps are not compatible with the civilian editors' programs. The Marine Corps's old hardware does not make fixing the problem any easier.

Thus, one to two years may pass from the time a doctrinal need is identified until a publication is ready for distribution. With the rapid pace of change today, doctrine may be obsolete by the time it is approved. Thus, an unresolvable paradox exists: rapid change dictates the need for rapid production, but a complex environment, dwindling funds, and inadequate numbers of personnel prevent rapid production. Unfortunately, increasing money and personnel

are not options. What options are there?

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Doing More with Less**

We recommend a three-pronged approach to improving the Marine Corps' ability to produce timely, accurate doctrine: reducing the research and draft burden on Doctrine Division, accelerating adoption of the CDP, and adjusting expectations. Specifics concerning reduction of the research and draft burden are as follows: decentralizing authorship responsibilities, maximizing adoption of other service doctrine, and shifting Doctrine Division's primary role to capstone documents and validation of externally produced documents. These recommendations allow pooling of scarce resources and eliminating duplication, thus maximizing resources. CDP adoption would improve unity of effort. Adjusting expectations provides a reasonable environment to set priorities.

First, appropriate Marine Schools can assume responsibility for tactical or technical type manuals, as schools should be on the cutting edge of innovation within their areas of responsibility and test newly developed equipment. Using schools would require much more interaction between the Marine Corps University and Doctrine Division. The schools would have a conduit for direct input into Marine Corps doctrine. Advanced schools could validate doctrine on a regular basis with each new class. Some of the Marine



Corps' best minds could examine doctrinal quandaries forwarded by Doctrine Division. We do not recommend that students write capstone publications, but that schools' resident talents be exploited to remove part of the research and initial draft burden.

Additionally, another way the Marine Corps can save more time and money is by adopting more Navy and Army doctrine. We already adopt some doctrine, but the area could possibly be exploited more. This is especially true with the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command and the emphasis on interoperability.

Lastly, we recommend that Doctrine Division act as a central review authority. All doctrine would still go through Doctrine Division for forwarding to the Commandant for approval and accounting purposes. Doctrine Division would produce the capstone documents which provide the foundation for all the supporting doctrinal publications. Decentralizing execution would allow Doctrine Division to focus more on reviewing doctrine, producing the large documents, and coordinating the prioritization of doctrinal needs.

#### **Tying Up Loose Ends**

Most importantly, however, the Marine Corps needs to move on with adoption of the Combat Development Process. Completed transition to the process would allow several administrative necessities to occur as follows: allowing development of comprehensive SOP's that define division roles

in the CDP, reviewing personnel and budget requirements, and establishing a knowledge base. Divisions need a blueprint to work from. Personnel realignment and budget reapportionment are vital.

Finally, the Marine Corps needs to realize that everything cannot be a priority and that we have neither the money nor the people to accomplish everything at once. Requirements need prioritization. Currently, Doctrine Division has twenty "priority" projects. This number is beyond their resources. Projects are started that later must sit while new "priorities" take over those resources. Why not sensibly prioritize initially and focus resources and energy accordingly, rather than spreading resources out and diminishing their effects? Scattered effort reemphasizes why a centralized agency controlling priorities is so vital.

Shutting down Marine Schools for a year to write doctrine would only provide a temporary solution. The simple truth is that the Marine Corps is in a period of transition and upheaval. However, the Marine Corps is continuously trying to modify itself without visualizing a true end state and how it plans to get there. The CDP is the right model for action in MCCDC and will produce results. Serious consideration and adoption of our recommendations would produce a lasting solution to a persistent problem. MCCDC may have finally learned "There is never enough time to do it right, but there is always enough time to do it over again."

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